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ci.2012.1Abstract In this paper, we propose a new security protocol for proxy signature by a hierarchy of
proxy signers. In this protocol, the original signer delegates his/her signing capability to a prede-
ﬁned hierarchy of proxy signers. Given the documents of a security class to be signed by the original
signer, our scheme suggests a protocol for the hierarchy of proxy signers to sign the document on
behalf of the original signer. The concept of hierarchical access control limits the number of people
who could sign the document to the people who have the required security clearances. User in a
security class requires two secret keys: one which identiﬁes his/her security clearance, and that
can also be derived by a user of upper level security clearance and second is his/her private key
which identiﬁes him/her as a proxy signer for the signature generation. We show that our scheme
is efﬁcient in terms of computational complexity as compared to the existing related proxy signature
schemes based on the hierarchical access control. Our scheme also supports addition and deletion of
security classes in the hierarchy. We show through security analysis that our scheme is secure
against possible attacks. Furthermore, through the formal security analysis using the AVISPA
(Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool we show that our
scheme is also secure against passive and active attacks.
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2.0011. Introduction
A digital signature can help to provide the integrity and authen-
ticity of a message, such as a document, ﬁle, etc. This concept
cannot however be applied directly to a situation where the ori-
ginal signer delegates his/her signing capability to a proxy sign-
er to sign the documents on behalf of himself/herself. Mambo
et al. (1996) introduced the concept of proxy signature. In a
proxy signature scheme, the original signer delegates his/her
signing capability to a proxy signer. The proxy signer signs
the documents on behalf of original signer. A veriﬁer can then
verify that the document is signed by a proxy signer. Further,
the veriﬁer can also verify its validity and that the proxy signer
has the capability to do so. More precisely, in a proxy signatureier B.V. All rights reserved.
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capability to a proxy signer by issuing a proxy key. The proxy
signer then signs a message on behalf of the original signer.
From the proxy signature signed by a proxy signer using the
proxy key, any veriﬁer can check the original signer’s digital
delegation as well as the proxy signer’s digital signature. Several
proxy signature schemes have been proposed in the literature
(Mambo et al., 1996; Shao, 2003; Tan et al., 2002). A survey
on proxy signatures can be found in Das et al. (2009).
Hierarchical access control is an interesting area of research
in the ﬁeld of cryptography. In such a system, there is a prede-
ﬁned hierarchy which gives the information of the security
clearance of a user belonging to a particular security class. This
hierarchy can be represented by a partially ordered set (poset).
A hierarchy is constructed by dividing the users into a number
n of disjoint security classes, say SC1,SC2, . . . ,SCn which are
partially ordered with a binary relation 6 deﬁned on the set
U= {SC1,SC2, . . . ,SCn}. In such a set, SCi 6 SCj implies that
SCj has the higher security clearance than that for SCi, and the
documents accessed by SCi can also be accessed by SCj, but
the reverse is not allowed. Consider an example of user hierar-
chy shown in Fig. 1. In this ﬁgure, a hierarchy is constructed
by a set of ﬁve disjoint security classes SC1, SC2,SC3, SC4,
and SC5. SC1 has the highest security clearance level. The secu-
rity classes SC2, SC4, and SC5 at the bottom level contain the
lowest security clearances. SC1 can access the secret informa-
tion possessed by SC2, SC3, SC4 and SC5. SC3 can again ac-
cess to the secret information held by SC4 and SC5.
Akl andTaylor (1983) proposed the ﬁrst-ever hierarchical ac-
cess control based key assignment scheme. Chung et al. (2008)
proposed a key management and derivation scheme based on
the elliptic curve cryptosystem. In their approach, the secret
key of each security class can be determined by a trusted central-
ized authority. Their scheme has the ability to solve the dynamic
key management efﬁciently and ﬂexibly. However, it is recently
shown inDas et al. (2012) that their scheme is vulnerable to exte-
rior root ﬁnding attack in which an attacker (adversary) who is
not a user in any security class in a user hierarchy can derive the
secret key of a security class by using the root ﬁnding algorithm.
Many dynamic access control schemes have been proposed in
the literature, some of them are Lin (1997), Akl and Taylor
(1983), Shen and Chen (2002), Zhong (2002), Sandhu (1988),
Giri and Srivastava (2007, 2008),Wu andWei (2005), andOdelu
et al. (in press, 2012, 2013).
In this paper, we devise a new proxy signature scheme
based on hierarchical access control. The main motivationSC
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Figure 1 An example of a poset in a user hierarchy.behind our new approach is as follows. In the absence of an
original signer, the signing capability can be delegated to a
group/set of users in a user hierarchy wherein the security
clearances of those users are predeﬁned. Note that the user
hierarchy contains only the security classes for proxy signers,
not for any original signers. For example, in an organization
some important documents can be singed on behalf of the head
of that organization. There is a predeﬁned hierarchy of secu-
rity clearances among the members of that organization. A
document of security clearance containing in the security class
SCi can be signed by that security class on behalf of the head
of the organization. For example, in Fig. 1, the documents
containing to the security class SC5 can be singed by either
SC1 or SC3 or SC5. The veriﬁer needs to verify the following
two conditions: (i) whether the right person has signed the doc-
ument and (ii) whether the user has been delegated the signing
capability to sign the document.
A widely accepted list of required security requirements for
a proxy signature is given below (Das et al., 2009):
 Strong unforgeability: A designated proxy signer can only
have the ability to create a valid signature on behalf of
the original signer, whereas the original signer and other
third parties cannot create a valid proxy signature.
 Strong identiﬁability: Anyone can determine the identity of
the proxy signer from the corresponding proxy signature.
 Strong undeniability: This property tells that once a proxy
signer has created a valid proxy signature on behalf of the
original signer, he/she cannot deny later the signature
creation.
 Veriﬁability: This means that the veriﬁer can be convinced
of the original signer’s agreement from the proxy signer.
 Distinguishability: Anyone can distinguish the proxy signa-
tures from the normal signatures.
 Secrecy: The original signer’s private key must not be
derived from any information, such as the sharing of the
proxy key, proxy signatures, etc.
 Prevention of misuse: The proxy signer cannot use the
proxy key for any other purpose than it is made for.
Giri et al. (2009) introduced the concept of proxy signature
based on hierarchical access control. Their scheme contains the
hierarchical access control scheme followed by a proxy signature
scheme. A trusted central authority is responsible for generating
and assigning keys to the users in the hierarchy. Their access con-
trol scheme is based on Newton’s interpolating polynomials.
Further, their scheme is also secure against different attacks.
Our scheme is different from the scheme proposed by Giri
et al. In our scheme, we deﬁne a set of designated proxy signers
in the user hierarchy selected by the original signer. Based on
the document pertaining to a particular security level class, the
original signer selects a user, called the proxy signer, from that
set based on their availability and work load who can sign
those documents on behalf of the original signer. In our
scheme, the secret key of the proxy signer is embedded into
the proxy signature so that any veriﬁer can verify that the right
person only has signed the document. We show through anal-
ysis and simulation using the AVISPA tool that our scheme is
secure against possible attacks. Furthermore, our scheme is
also efﬁcient as compared to Giri et al.’s scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we discuss some mathematical preliminaries which are needed
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brieﬂy the mathematical background on the one-way hash
function, the polynomial evaluation over a ﬁnite ﬁeld and
the discrete logarithm problem. In Section 3, we introduce
our new proxy signature scheme which uses the concept of
hierarchical access control policy. In Section 4, we analyze
the performance and security for our proposed scheme. In Sec-
tion 5, we show through simulation that our scheme is secure
against passive and active attacks. For this purpose, we use the
AVISPA tool for formal security analysis in this paper. In Sec-
tion 6, we compare the performance of our scheme with Giri
et al.’s scheme. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we describe brieﬂy the mathematical back-
ground on the one-way hash function, the polynomial evalua-
tion over a ﬁnite ﬁeld and the discrete logarithm problem,
which are useful for discussing and analyzing our proposed
scheme.
2.1. Hash functions
A one-way hash function H:{0,1}* ﬁ {0,1}n takes an arbi-
trary-length input x 2 {0,1}*, and produces a ﬁxed-length
(say, n-bits) output H(x) 2 {0,1}n, called the message digest
or hash value. The hash function can be applied to the ﬁnger-
print of a ﬁle, a message, or other data blocks, and it has the
following important attributes (Stallings, 2003):
(i) The hash function, H can be applied to a data block of
all sizes.
(ii) For any given input x, H(x) is relatively easy to compute
which enables easy implementation in software and
hardware.
(iii) The output length of H(x) is ﬁxed.
(iv) From a given hash value y=H(x) and the given hash
functionH(Æ), it is computationally infeasible to derive x.
(v) For any given input x, ﬁnding any other input y(„x)
such that H(y) =H(x) is computationally infeasible.
(vi) Finding a pair of inputs (x,y), (x „ y), such that
H(x) = H(y) is again computationally infeasible.
An example of a one-way hash function is SHA-1 (Secure
Hash Standard, 1995), which has the above desired properties
(i) to (vi). However, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) does not recommend SHA-1 for top secret
documents. Further, in 2011, Manuel showed collision attacks
on SHA-1 (Manuel, 2011). As in Das (2012b,a) one can also
use the recently proposed one-way hash function, Quark
(Aumasson et al., 2010). Quark is a family of cryptographic
hash functions which is designed for extremely resource-
constrained environments like sensor networks and radio-
frequency identiﬁcation (RFID) tags. Like most one-way hash
functions, Quark can be used as a pseudo-random function
(PRF), a message authentication code (MAC), a pseudo-ran-
dom number generator (PRNG), a key derivation function,
etc. Quark is shown to be much efﬁcient hash function than
SHA-1. However, in this paper, we use SHA-2 as the secure
one-way hash function in order to achieve top security. We
may use only 160-bits from the hash digest output of SHA-2.2.2. Polynomial evaluation in GF(q)
Given a polynomial f(x) of degree t, where f(x) =
atx
t + at1x
t1 +   + a1t+ a0 2 GF(q)[x] whose coefﬁ-
cients ai’s are from the ﬁnite ﬁeld, Galois ﬁeld GF(q),q being
a prime. By applying Horner’s rule (Cormen et al., 2010), we
require t modular multiplications and t modular additions in
order to ﬁnd the value of f(x) at a point x= x0.
In a special case, if f(x) is of the form fðxÞ ¼Qti¼0
ðx aiÞ þ b ðmod qÞ, where ai’s and b are from GF(q), then
to ﬁnd the value of b, we need any one of the values ai’s. Using
that ai, we can ﬁnd b by b= f(ai) (mod q), for some i.
2.3. Computational problems
In this section, we describe two computational problems: Dis-
crete Exponentiation Problem (DEP) and Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP).
2.3.1. Discrete exponentiation problem (DEP)
Given a multiplicative group G and an element g 2 G having
order n. Then, compute y= gx modn, for any given x. This
problem is computationally easy/feasible even if n is large. This
modular exponentiation can be done efﬁciently by using the re-
peated square-and-multiply algorithm with time complexity
O((log2n)
3) (Delfs and Knebl, 2007).
2.3.2. Discrete logarithm problem (DLP)
Given an element g in a ﬁnite group G whose order is n, that is,
n= #Gg (Gg is the subgroup of G generated by g) and another
element y in Gg, ﬁnd the smallest non-negative integer x such
that gx = y. It is relatively easy to calculate discrete exponen-
tiation gx (mod n) given g, x and n, but it is computationally
infeasible to determine x given y, g and n, when n is large.
3. The proposed hierarchical-based proxy signature scheme
In this section, we ﬁrst list the notations to be used in our
scheme. We then discuss the different phases of our scheme.
3.1. Notations
We use the notations listed in Table 1 for describing our pro-
posed proxy signature scheme.
3.2. Different phases
Our scheme contains six phases: setup phase, delegation phase,
proxy signature generation phase, proxy signature veriﬁcation
phase, and phases for addition of new security classes in the hier-
archy and removal of existing security classes from the hierarchy.
3.2.1. Setup phase
In this phase, the system parameters for the original signer are
selected. The central certiﬁcation authority (CA) then chooses
the system parameters for each security class in the hierarchy.
This phase consists of the following steps:
Step 1. CA selects large primes p and q such that p  1 is per-
fectly divisible by q, that is, q Œp  1.
Table 1 Notations used in the proposed scheme.
Symbol Description
p A large prime number
q A larger prime such that q––p  1
A Original signer
B Proxy signer
V Veriﬁer
ski Full secret key of security class, SCi
si Partial secret key of security class, SCi
Fi(x) Public polynomial of security class, SCi
g Generator of original signer, A
gi Generator of security class, SCi
SiT Data S concatenates with data T
XA Secret key of original signer, A
XB Secret key of proxy signer, B
YA Public key of original signer, A
YB Public key of proxy signer, B
H(Æ) Secure one-way hash function
Mw Warrant of a message, M
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Zp ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; p  1g.
Step 3. Consider a user hierarchy where there are n security
classes SC1,SC2, . . . ,SCn in the hierarchy with par-
tially ordered relation 6 deﬁned on it. The CA then
generates n generators g1; g2; . . . ; gn 2 Zq for n secu-
rity classes in the user hierarchy, where
Zq ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; q 1g.
Step 4. CA generates randomly the full secret key ski 2 Zq
and partial secret key si 2 Zq for each security class
SCi in the user hierarchy.
Step 5. CA then calculates the public polynomial Fj(x) for
each security class SCj in the hierarchy as
F jðxÞ ¼
Q
SCi>SCj
ðx gsij Þ þ skj ðmod qÞ as in Chung
et al. (2008).
Step 6. CA sends (ski,si) to each security class SCi in the hier-
archy via a secure channel.
Step 7. CA also sends the public polynomial Fi(x), q and gi to
each security class SCi via a public channel. CA
ﬁnally makes p, q, g, gj’s, Fj(x)’s and the hash function
H(Æ) as public.
An example. Consider again the user hierarchy shown in
Fig. 1. The public polynomials for the security classes con-
structed in Step 5 are as follows:
SC1 : F1ðxÞ ¼ x gs01ð Þ þ sk1 ðmod qÞ; where s0 is given by CA
SC2 : F2ðxÞ ¼ x gs12ð Þ þ sk2 ðmod qÞ
SC3 : F3ðxÞ ¼ x gs13ð Þ þ sk3 ðmod qÞ
SC4 : F4ðxÞ ¼ x gs14ð Þðx gs34 Þ þ sk4 ðmod qÞ
SC5 : F5ðxÞ ¼ x gs15ð Þðx gs35 Þ þ sk5 ðmod qÞ
3.2.2. Delegation phase
In order to delegate the signing capability to a proxy signer,
the original signer A executes the following steps:
Step 1. The original signer A selects a random or pseudoran-
dom integer XA(1 < XA < p  1) and computes a
public key Y A ¼ gXA ðmod pÞ, where g is the genera-
tor in Zp.Step 2. A selects a random or pseudorandom integer k 2 Zq
and computes r= gk (mod p).
Step 3. Suppose the documents to be signed belonging to a
security class in the hierarchy is known to the original
signer A. However, as pointed out earlier in this paper
that the original signer A is not any user of any secu-
rity classes in the user hierarchy and the user hierar-
chy consists of only the security classes of proxy
signers. A then selects a set P of designated proxy
signers who are the users in security classes of the
hierarchy. Since the document class is known to the
original signer A, so the set P is also known to the ori-
ginal signer A. A can choose a user in a security class
from P for which the user is available during that time
period and also that user is not overloaded with other
works. Let the proxy signer be a user in a security
class SCi 2 P and we call that user as the proxy
signer, B in our scheme. For example, in Fig. 1, if
the documents of SC5 need to be signed, then A can
select any one of the users in SC1, SC3 and SC5 as
a proxy signer.
Step 4. A then calculates s= XAr+ k Mw (mod q), where
Mw is a warrant message which includes the identities
of the original signer and the proxy signer, and also
an expiration date.
Step 5. The original signer A selects a proxy signer B from the
set P of designated proxy signers and sends the mes-
sage Ær, s,Mwæ to B via a secure channel.
3.2.3. Proxy signature generation phase
In order to generate signature on documents belonging to a
security class SCc 2 P, the proxy signer B who is a user in secu-
rity class SCi 2 P (SCc 6 SCi) proceeds with the following
steps:
Step 1. On receiving the tuple (r, s,Mw) from the original
signer A, the proxy signer B veriﬁes whether
gs ¼ rMwY rA ðmod pÞ holds or not. If it holds, B
accepts the tuple (r, s,Mw) as a valid tuple. Note
thatgs ¼ gXArþkMw ðmod qÞ ðmod pÞ
¼ ðgXAÞr  ðgkÞMw ðmod pÞ ¼ rMwYrA ðmod pÞ:Step 2. In order to compute the secret key skc of the security
class SCc, B ﬁrst computes u ¼ gsic ðmod qÞ using the
public generator gc of SCc and its own class SCi’s
partial secret key si. B then computes the full secret
key skc as skc ¼ F cðuÞ ðmod qÞ ¼ F c gsic ðmod qÞ
 
ðmod qÞ by evaluating the public polynomial Fc(x)
of the security class SCc at the point u.
Step 3. B selects a random or pseudorandom integer
XB(1 < XB < q  1) and computes a public key
Y B ¼ gXB ðmod pÞ, where g is the generator in Zp.
Step 4. LetM be the message (document of SCc) to be signed
by B. B computes H(MiMwiskcisi), s0 = s+
H(MiMwiskcisi)XB (mod q) and t ¼ gs0 ðmod pÞ.
Step 5. B then computes the hash value H(MiMwit).
The proxy signature on the message M is considered
as the tuple (M,Mw,H(MiMwiskcisi), r,H(Mi
Mwit)).
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si), r,H(MiMwit)æ to the veriﬁer or receiver V via a
public channel.
3.2.4. Proxy signature veriﬁcation phase
In order to verify the proxy signature on the message M, the
veriﬁer V does the following steps:
Step 1. V ﬁrst computes t0 ¼ rMw  Y rA  Y HðMkMwkskcksiÞB ðmod pÞ,
using the received r, H(MiMwiskcisi), Mw, and the
public keys YA and YB.
Step 2. V then computes the hash value H(MiMwi t0) using
the computed value of t0 and the received messageM.
Step 3. Finally, V veriﬁes whether the computed hash value
H(MiMwit0) matches with the received hash value
H(M iMwit). If there is a match, V accepts B’s signa-
ture as a valid signature; otherwise, V rejects the sig-
nature of B.
We have summarized the delegation, proxy signature gener-
ation and proxy signature veriﬁcation phases of our scheme in
Table 2.
3.2.5. Addition of new security classes in hierarchy
Some times we require to add/remove security classes into the
hierarchy. Therefore, dynamic access control must be pro-
vided. In this phase, we show how a new security class can
be added to the hierarchy. Suppose a new security class SCk
will be inserted into the hierarchy such that SCiP SCkP SCj.
CA renews the secret keys skj of successors SCj of the newly
added security class SCk. CA also changes the public polyno-
mial Fj(x) with F
0
jðxÞ of SCj. CA needs the following steps:
Step 1: CA updates the partial relationships that follow when
the security class SCk joins the hierarchy.
Step 2: CA selects the full secret key skk 2 Zq, the partial
secret key sk 2 Zq randomly and generator gk 2 Zq
for SCk.Table 2 Different phases of the proposed scheme.
Original signer (A) Proxy signer (B)
Delegation phase
Sends via a secure channel: !hr;s;Mwi
Proxy signature generation phase
Veriﬁes if gs ¼ rMwYrA ðmod pÞ.
If it holds, B accepts (r, s,Mw) as va
Computes skc ¼ Fcðgsic Þ ðmod qÞ;Hð
s0 ¼ sþHðMkMwkskcksiÞXB ðmod q
t ¼ gs0 ðmod pÞ and H(MiMwit).
Sends via a public channel:
!hM;Mw ;HðMkMwkskcksiÞ;r;HðMkMwktÞi
Proxy signature veriﬁcation phaseStep 3: For all SCi that satisﬁes the relationship SCi P SCk
when the new class SCk is inserted in the hierarchy,
CA computes gsik ðmod qÞ.
Step 4: CA then computes the public polynomial Fk(x) for
SCk as F kðxÞ ¼
Q
SCi>SCk
x gsikð Þ þ skk ðmod qÞ
Step 5: For all SCi such that SCiP SCk and for all SCj such
that SCiP SCkP SCj when the new class SCk is
inserted in the hierarchy, CA replaces the secret key
skj with sk
0
j and computes the updated public
polynomial F 0jðxÞ as F 0jðxÞ ¼
Q
SCi>SCk>SCj
x gsij
 
x gskj
 þ sk0j ðmod qÞ.
Step 6: Finally, CA replaces Fj(x) with F
0
jðxÞ, and sends sk0j to
SCj via a secure channel, and announces publicly
F 0jðxÞ. CA also sends skk and sk to SCk via a secure
channel, and announces publicly Fk(x).
Note that in order to resist the exterior root ﬁnding attack,
we have replaced skj by sk
0
j in the updated polynomial F
0
jðxÞ for
SCj.
An example. Consider the user hierarchy shown in Fig. 2, in
which the new security class SC6 is added to the existing hier-
archy shown in Fig. 1. Then, the public polynomials for the
security classes will be as follows:
SC1 : F1ðxÞ ¼ x gs01ð Þ þ sk1 ðmod qÞ; where s0 is given by CA
SC2 : F2ðxÞ ¼ x gs12ð Þ þ sk2 ðmod qÞ
SC3 : F3ðxÞ ¼ x gs13ð Þ þ sk3 ðmod qÞ
SC4 : F4ðxÞ ¼ x gs14ð Þ x gs34ð Þ þ sk4 ðmod qÞ
SC5 : F
0
5ðxÞ ¼ x gs15ð Þ x gs35ð Þ x gs65ð Þ þ sk05 ðmod qÞ
SC6 : F6ðxÞ ¼ x gs16ð Þ þ sk6 ðmod qÞ3.2.6. Removal of existing security classes in hierarchy
This phase remains similar to that as in Chung et al. (2008).
Now, if an existing security class SCk, such that the relation-
ship SCiP SCkP SCj breaks up, wants to leave from a user
hierarchy, CA not only directly revokes information related
to SCk, but also it needs to alter the accessing relationship be-Veriﬁer (V)
lid tuple.
MkMwkskcksiÞ;
Þ;
Computes t0 ¼ rMwYrAYHðMkMwkskcksiÞB ðmod pÞ
and H(MiMwit0).
Veriﬁes if H(MiMwit0) = H(MiMwit).
If above holds, V accepts B’s signature; otherwise,
V rejects B’s signature.
SC
SC
SC
SC
SC
2
1
3
4 5
SC 6
Figure 2 An example of a poset in a user hierarchy: when a new
security class SC6 is added to the existing hierarchy in Fig. 1.
role originalsigner (A, B, V   : agent,
                SKab: symmetric_key,
                H : hash_func,
                F : hash_func,
           Snd, Rcv: channel(dy))
played_by A
def=
         local State  : nat,
         K, G, P, Q, XA, YA, Mw :  text
         const alice_bob_na,  bob_alice_nb, bob_verifier_nc, 
         verifier_bob_nd, subs1, subs2 : protocol_id
  init  State := 0
  transition
   1. State   = 0 /\ Rcv(start) =|>
      State’ := 1 /\ K’ := new()
                  /\ secret({K’, XA}, subs1, A)
                  /\ Snd({exp(G, K’).F(XA.exp(G, K’).K’.Mw)}_SKab
                         .P.Q) 
                  /\ witness(A, B, bob_alice_nb, K’)
end role
Table 3 Notations used for computational costs in the
proposed scheme.
Symbol Description
tmul Time taken by one modular multiplication operation
texp Time taken by one modular exponentiation operation
th Time taken to compute one hash value
tadd Time taken for one modular addition operation
tpoly Time taken for evaluating Fi(x) at a point in GF(q)
224 A.K. Das et al.tween the involved ex-predecessor SCi and ex-successor SCj of
SCk. CA requires the following steps for this purpose.
Step 1: CA needs to update the partial relationship that fol-
lows when SCk is removed.
Step 2: For all SCk such that the relationship SCkP SCj
holds, CA renews the secret key skj as sk
0
j and the gen-
erator gj as g0j of SCj. Then, for all SCi such that the
relationship SCiP SCj holds, CA renews the rela-
tionship SCiP SCj after removing SCk, computes
the public polynomial F 0jðxÞ as F 0jðxÞ ¼
Q
SCi>SCjðx g0sij Þ þ sk0j ðmod qÞ and replaces Fj(x) with F 0jðxÞ.
Step 3: CA ﬁnally sends sk0j to SCj via a secret channel and
announces g0j and F
0
jðxÞ as public.Figure 3 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the original signer, A
of our scheme.
role proxysigner (A,B,V   : agent,
                SKab: symmetric_key,
         H : hash_func,
                F : hash_func,
                Snd, Rcv: channel(dy))
played_by B4. Analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we ﬁrst show the correctness of our proposed
scheme. We then analyze the computational overhead required
for our scheme. Finally, we show that our scheme can tolerate
different security attacks.
4.1. Correctness of the proposed scheme
def=
         local State  : nat,
         K, G, P, Q, XA, YA, Gc, Si, SKc, XB, YB, M, Mw :  text
         const alice_bob_na,  bob_alice_nb, bob_verifier_nc, 
               verifier_bob_nd, subs1, subs2 : protocol_id
   init  State := 0
  transition
   1. State   = 0 /\ Rcv({exp(G, K’).F(XA.exp(G, K’).K’.Mw)}_SKab
                         .P.Q) =|>  
      State’ := 1 /\ M’ := new()
                  /\ secret({K’, XA}, subs1, A)
                  /\ secret({Si, SKc, XB}, subs2, B)
                  /\ Snd(M’.Mw.exp(G, K’).H(M’.Mw.exp(G, (F(XA.exp(G, K’)
                         .K’.Mw)).H(M’.Mw.SKc.Si).XB)).H(M’.Mw.SKc.Si).P.Q)
                  /\ witness(B, V, verifier_bob_nd, SKc)
end role
Figure 4 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the proxy signer, B of
our scheme.Theorem 1. If all the entities follow the scheme described in
Section 3, the veriﬁcation equation H(MiMwit0) =H(MiMwit)
holds, where t0 ¼ rMwYrAYHðMkMwkskcksiÞB ðmod pÞ.
Proof. In order to prove H(MiMwit0) = H(MiMwit), it suf-
ﬁces to show that t0 = t. Now,
t ¼ gs0 ðmodpÞ ¼ gsþXBHðMkMwkskcksiÞ ðmod qÞðmod pÞ
¼ gsgXBHðMkMwkskcksiÞ ðmod pÞ
¼ gXArþkMwðgXBÞHðMkMwkskcksiÞ ðmod pÞ
¼ ðgXAÞrðgkÞMwYHðMkMwkskcksiÞB ðmod pÞ
¼ rMw  YrA  YHðMkMwkskcksiÞB ðmod pÞ ¼ t0:
Hence, the theorem is proved. h4.2. Computational overhead
For analyzing the computational costs, we use the notations
described in Table 3.From the delegation phase described in Section 3.2.2, it is
clear that the original signer requires the computational
complexity 2texp + 2tmul + tadd during this phase. The proxy
signature generation phase described in Section 3.2.3 requires
role verifier  (A, B, V   : agent,
          H : hash_func,
                  F : hash_func,
             Snd, Rcv: channel(dy))
played_by V
def=
         local State  : nat,
         K, G, P, Q, XA, YA, Gc, Si, SKc, XB, YB, M, Mw :  text
         const alice_bob_na,  bob_alice_nb, bob_verifier_nc, 
               verifier_bob_nd, subs1, subs2 : protocol_id
   init  State := 0
  transition
   1. State   = 0 /\ Rcv(M’.Mw.exp(G, K’).H(M’.Mw.exp(G, (F(XA.
                         exp(G, K’).K’.Mw)).H(M’.Mw.SKc.Si).XB)).
                         H(M’.Mw.SKc.Si).P.Q) =|> 
      State’ := 1 /\ secret({K’, XA}, subs1, A)
                  /\ secret({Si, SKc, XB}, subs2, B)
                  
end role
Figure 5 Role speciﬁcation in HLPSL for the veriﬁer, V of our
scheme.
% OFMC
% Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
  SAFE
DETAILS
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
PROTOCOL
  C:\progra~1\SPAN\testsuite\results\proxy_signature.if
GOAL
  as_specified
BACKEND
  OFMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
  parseTime: 0.00s
  visitedNodes: 0 nodes
  depth: 15 plies       
  searchTime: 8.28s
Figure 6 Result of the analysis using OFMC of our scheme.
SUMMARY
  SAFE
DETAILS
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
  TYPED_MODEL
PROTOCOL
 C:\progra~1\SPAN\testsuite\results\proxy_signature.if
GOAL
  As Specified
BACKEND
  CL−AtSe
STATISTICS
  Analysed   : 981 states
  Reachable  : 978 states
  Translation: 0.02 seconds
  Computation: 0.08 seconds
Figure 7 Result of the analysis using CL-AtSe of our scheme.
SUMMARY
  SAFE
DETAILS
  STRONGLY_TYPED_MODEL
  BOUNDED_NUMBER_OF_SESSIONS
  BOUNDED_SEARCH_DEPTH
  BOUNDED_MESSAGE_DEPTH
PROTOCOL
GOAL
  %% see the HLPSL specification..
BACKEND
  SATMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
  attackFound               false     boolean
  upperBoundReached         true      boolean
  graphLeveledOff           3         steps
  satSolver                 zchaff    solver
  maxStepsNumber            11        steps
  stepsNumber               3         steps
  atomsNumber               0         atoms
  clausesNumber             0         clauses
  encodingTime              0.24      seconds
  solvingTime               0         seconds
  if2sateCompilationTime    102.32    seconds
ATTACK TRACE
  %% no attacks have been found..
  proxy_signature.if
Figure 8 Result of the analysis using SATMC of our scheme.
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mul + 2th, whereas the proxy signature veriﬁcation phase de-
scribed in Section 3.2.4 requires the computational
complexity 3texp + 2tmul + th.
4.3. Security analysis
In this section, we show that our scheme satisﬁes all the secu-
rity requirements of a proxy signature. The security require-
ments are discussed in the following subsections.
4.3.1. Unforgeability
Let an original signer being an attacker try to forge a proxy
signature on any arbitrary message M0. Suppose the attacker
chooses M0;M0w;H M
0kM0wkskcksi
 0
and tries to ﬁnd s0 such
that t ¼ gs0 ðmod pÞ, where s0 = s+ H(MiMwi skcisi)XB
(mod q). The attacker knows the values M, Mw, p, q, s, YA
and YB. It is noted that the original signer, who is an attacker
in this case, is not any user of the hierarchy. Therefore, to
retrieve skc of the document class SCc of the hierarchy, theattacker needs to know the partial secret keys si of designated
proxy signers’ security classes. But then computing the secret
key skc of the document class SCc of the hierarchy from the
hash value H(MiMwiskcisi) knowing M and Mw is computa-
tionally infeasible due to one-way property of the hash func-
tion H(Æ). Moreover, in order to compute s0 the attacker
needs to know the private key XB of the proxy signer B, which
is again a computationally infeasible problem because XB is
embedded with H(MiMwit) in s0. Also to determine directly
XB from YB ¼ gXB ðmod pÞ is a computationally infeasible
problem due to the difﬁculty of solving DLP (discussed in
Table 5 Functionality comparison between the proposed
scheme and Giri et al.’s scheme.
Giri et al. (2009) Ours
I1
p p
I2
p p
I3
p p
I4
p p
I5
p p
I6
p p
I7 ·
p
Table 4 Performance comparison for computational costs between the proposed scheme and Giri et al.’s scheme.
Phase Giri et al. (2009) Ours
Delegation 4texp + 6tmul + 2tadd 2texp + 2tmul + tadd
Proxy signature generation 2texp + th + tmul + 2tadd 6 texp + tpoly + tadd + 2tmul + 2th
Proxy signature veriﬁcation 3texp + th + 5tmul 3texp + 2tmul + th
226 A.K. Das et al.Section 2). Hence, the attacker does not have any ability to
recompute HðM0kM0wktÞ and as a result, the attacker, who is
the original signer, cannot forge a proxy signature.
Consider the case where the attacker is one of the users in
the set P of designated signers chosen by the original signer
A. Now, other security classes in the set P can also derive
the secret key skc of the document class SCc of the hierarchy
if those security classes have higher security clearances than
that for SCc. However, the original signer sends the delegation
message Ær, s,Mwæ to the proxy signer via a secure channel. As a
result, the attacker does not have any ability to recreate a valid
proxy signature on behalf of the delegated proxy signer B and
he/she cannot forge a proxy signature.
4.3.2. Identiﬁability
Any veriﬁer can easily determine the relationship of the delega-
tion between the original signer and a proxy signer due to the
following reason. In our scheme, in order to verify a proxy sig-
nature the veriﬁer requires the veriﬁcation condition H(MiM-
wit0) = H(Mi Mwit), where t0 ¼ rMwYrAYHðMkMwkskcksiÞB ðmod pÞ;
s0 ¼ sþHðMkMwkskcksiÞXB ðmod qÞ and t ¼ gs0 ðmod pÞ.
Recall that the warrant message Mw contains the identities
of the original signer and a proxy signer along with an expira-
tion date. Thus, the veriﬁer can determine whether the signa-
ture was generated by a proxy signer on behalf of the
original signer or not.
4.3.3. Undeniability
In signature generation of our scheme, the proxy signer com-
putes ﬁrst s0 = s+ H(MiMwiskcisi)XB (mod q) and then
t ¼ gs0 ðmod pÞ. Thus, s0 is computed using the private key
XB and the partial secret key si of the proxy signer and hence,
t contains the private key XB and the partial secret key si of
that proxy signer. Due to usages of XB and si in the proxy sig-
nature creation, the proxy signer has no way to deny later
about this proxy signature creation by himself/herself on be-
half of the original signer.4.3.4. Veriﬁability
In the proxy signature generation phase of our scheme, after
receiving the tuple (r, s,Mw) from the original signer A, the
proxy signer B veriﬁes the condition gs ¼ rMwYrA ðmod pÞ
using the public key YA of A, and other information such as
g, s, r, Mw and p. Thus, the proxy signer can verify the delega-
tion power of the original signer, and as a result our proposed
scheme is veriﬁable.
4.3.5. Distinguishability
From our proxy signature veriﬁcation phase described in Sec-
tion 3.2.4, we note that the veriﬁer V needs to compute
t0 ¼ rMwYrAYHðMkMwkskcksiÞB ðmod pÞ and then to check the veriﬁ-
cation condition H(MiMwit0) =H(MiMw it). Here t is gener-
ated by the proxy signer as t ¼ gs0 ðmod pÞ;
s0 ¼ sþHðMkMwkskcksiÞXB ðmod qÞ, and r= gk (mod p)
and s= XA r+ k Mw (mod q) are generated by the original
signer. Thus, the veriﬁer can distinguish the signature of the
proxy signer from the normal signatures.
4.3.6. Secrecy
Note that during the delegation phase of our scheme, the ori-
ginal signer generates a private key XA(1 < XA < p  1) and
computes the public key YA ¼ gXA ðmod pÞ. After that the ori-
ginal signer selects a random integer k 2 Zq and computes the
public value r= gk (mod p). Finally, the original signer com-
putes s= XA r+ k Mw (mod q) and sends the message Ær, s,M-
wæ to the proxy signer via a secure channel. Now, deriving k
from r= gk (mod p) and XA from YA ¼ gXA ð mod pÞ is com-
putationally infeasible due to the difﬁculty of solving DLP.
Consequently, deriving XA from s= XAr+ k Mw (mod q) be-
comes a computationally infeasible problem. Thus, the origi-
nal signer’s private key XA cannot be derived from any
public information by an attacker, and as a result the secrecy
property is also preserved by our scheme.
5. Simulation results for formal security analysis
In this section, we have implemented our scheme under the
AVISPA model checkers for formal security analysis to verify
whether there is any attack on our scheme or not. Crypto-
graphic protocols are analyzed by the AVISPA tool and re-
quire to be speciﬁed in a language called HLPSL (High
Level Protocol Speciﬁcation Language), which is a role based
language. In HLPSL, basic roles represent each participant’s
role, and the composition of roles for representing scenarios
of basic roles. AVISPA supports four model checkers, called
the back-ends. The On-the-ﬂy Model-Checker (OFMC) is a
back-end which is responsible for performing several symbolic
techniques to explore the state space in a demand-driven way.
A novel proxy signature scheme based on user hierarchical access control policy 227The CL-AtSe (Constraint-Logic-based Attack Searcher) is the
second back-end which provides a translation from any secu-
rity protocol speciﬁcation written as transition relation in an
intermediate format into a set of constraints which are effec-
tively used to check whether there are possible attacks on pro-
tocols. Third back-end called the SAT-based Model-Checker
(SATMC), and the fourth back-end called TA4SP (Tree Auto-
mata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of
Security Protocols) approximate the intruder knowledge by
using the propositional formula and regular tree languages
respectively.
The backends produce the output in the following formats.
The ﬁrst printed section is called the SUMMARY which indi-
cates whether the protocol is safe, unsafe, or whether the anal-
ysis is inconclusive. The second section called DETAILS,
which explains under what condition the protocol is declared
safe, or what conditions have been used for ﬁnding an attack,
or ﬁnally why the analysis was inconclusive. The other sections
called PROTOCOL, GOAL and BACKEND are the name of
the protocol, the goal of the analysis and the name of the back-
end used, respectively. After comments and statistics, the trace
of the attack (if any) is ﬁnally displayed in the usual Alice-Bob
notation. More details on AVISPA tool can be found in von
Oheimb (2005) and Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Applications (2011).
Fig. 3 shows the speciﬁcation in HLPSL language for the
role of the initiator, the original signer A. A sends the message
Æ r, s,Mwæ to proxy signer B via a secure channel, who is a user
in the security class SCi in the set P.
Fig. 4 shows the speciﬁcation in HLPSL language for the
role of the proxy signer B. After receiving the message
Ær, s,Mwæ from A, it sends the message ÆM,Mw,H(MiMw iskci
si), r,H(MiMwit)æ to the veriﬁer or receiver V via a public
channel.
In Fig. 5, we have implemented the role of the veriﬁer, V in
HLPSL. The veriﬁer receives the message ÆM,Mw,H(MiMw
iskcisi), r,H(MiMwit)æ from B via a public channel.
We assume that the intruder has knowledge of all public
parameters. We have simulated our scheme using the Security
Protocol ANimator for AVISPA (SPAN). The results are
tested using OFMC, CL-AtSe and SATMC backends. The re-
sults of the analysis using OFMC, CL-AtSe and SATMC of
our scheme are shown in Figs. 6–8. The summary of simula-
tion results are as follows:
 OFMC reports the protocol is safe.
 CL-AtSe reports the protocol is safe.
 SATMC reports the protocol is safe.
From the detailed results of simulation, it is found that
there are no possible passive and active attacks on our scheme.6. Performance comparison with related schemes
In this section, we compare the performance and security of
our scheme with other related schemes. To best of our knowl-
edge, Giri et al.’s proxy signature scheme is only based on the
hierarchical access control so far in the literature. For this rea-
son, we thus compare the performance of our scheme with Giri
et al.’s scheme only. For comparing the computational costs
between Giri et al.’s scheme and our scheme, we have usedthe same notations described in Table 3. Performance compar-
ison in terms of computational complexity between our scheme
and Giri et al.’s scheme is shown in Table 4. Note that Giri
et al.’s scheme requires more computational time during the
delegation and proxy signature veriﬁcation phases as com-
pared to those for our scheme. However, our scheme requires
more computational complexity during the proxy signature
generation phase as compared to that for Giri et al.’s scheme.
Overall, our scheme is comparable with Giri et al.’s scheme
from the computational complexity point of view.
In Table 5, we have shown the functionality comparison
between our scheme and Giri et al.’s scheme. In this table,
we have used the following notations. I1: Whether satisﬁes
unforgeability security requirement or not; I2: Whether satis-
ﬁes identiﬁability security requirement or not; I3: Whether sat-
isﬁes undeniability security requirement or not; I4: Whether
satisﬁes veriﬁability security requirement or not; I5: Whether
satisﬁes distinguishability security requirement or not; I6:
Whether satisﬁes secrecy security requirement or not; I7:
Whether ﬂexible in choosing the proxy signer or not. We note
that our scheme is secure against the possible attacks which are
demonstrated through the analytical and simulation results
discussed in Sections 4.3 and 5, respectively. In addition, our
scheme has the ﬂexibility in choosing the proxy signers from
a designated set of proxy signers based on their availability
and work load, whereas Giri et al.’s scheme does not have that
criteria.
7. Conclusion
We have proposed a new proxy signature scheme based on hier-
archical access control. In our scheme the documents of a user
belonging to a security class in the hierarchy can be signed by a
proxy signer who is either that user or any user belonging to
some security class in a set of designated proxy signers selected
by the original signer. Our scheme satisﬁes all the security
requirements needed by a proxy signature. The proposed
scheme is also efﬁcient in terms of computational complexity
as compared with the existing related proxy signature schemes.
In addition, dynamic access control such as addition of new
security classes into the hierarchy and removal of existing secu-
rity classes from the hierarchy is supported efﬁciently.
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